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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ELVA ROMRELL, 
vs. 
* * * * * * * * * * * * 
Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
No. 16211 
ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK, 
N.A., and ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL: 
BANK OF OGDEN, 
Defendants and 
Appellants. 
* * * * * * • * * * • * 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
* * * * * * * * * * * * 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an action for specific performance of an oral 
contract to sell plaintiff a dairy farm comprised of 160 
acres of real property in Weber County, Utah, or, in the 
alternative, for compensatory damages for fraud. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Following the court's denial of defendants' motion for 
a directed verdict and the presentation of the defense, the 
:ury unanimously returned a general verdict finding the 
:ssues 1n favor of the plaintiff on her claim for specific 
~erfarmance. Plaintiff's alternative claim for damages 
·. c~ c:Cereby rendered moot. The trial court entered judgment thereon, 
-1-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
directinq the defendants to convey the real property in ques-
tion to the plaintiff. The trial court subsequently denied 
defendants' motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict 
or, in the alternative, for a new trial, whereupon defendants 
appealed. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent asks the court to affirm the aforesaid judgQent 
on the verdict entered by the trial court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellants' Statement of Facts presents an oversinplified 
version of the evidence largely favorable to the appellants' 
2osition at trial. Respondent therefore submits this Counter-
statement of Facts in order to present the evidence in its ~roper 
perspective on appeal. See e.g., llhyte v. Christensen, 550 P.2d 
1289 (Utah 1976). 
Elva Romrell first became interested in purchasing the 
real property involved herein during the latter part of March, 
1975, when her brother, Lawrence Muirbrook, infor~ed her that 
Zions Bank was foreclosing on 450 acres of real estate owned by 
himself, Robert Muirbrook, and Nuirbrook Farns, Inc. (R. 237-39.'· 
The Muirbrooks had acknowledged the default and surrendered 
possession of certain dairy equi[)ment and other personal pro['er~. 
to Zions on or about March 19, 1975. (R. 416-19). 
Mrs. Romrell was ?articular!; concerned about t~e ~enJ1n° 
foreclosure sale, s1nce the ~arm ~as t~e place of ner birtn an~ 
-2-
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had been in the Muirbrook family for years. (R. 233-36). 
Although she was not directly asked to become involved, she 
made the decision to approach the bank about correcting the 
default or purchasing the property for herself. (R. 239, 243). 
For some years preceding the foreclosure sale, the Muir-
brook family had maintained a dairy operation on approximately 
160 acres of their 450-acre farm in Weber County. (R. 234). 
The dairy operation necessitated the use of many items of pro-
cessing equipment and other personal property located on the 160 
acres of the real property. (R. 265-66). From the very begin-
ning, Respondent desired to purchase the 160 acres of real 
property and the dairy equipment as a unit for the simple reason 
that no one could continue to operate the dairy without owning 
both the real and personal components thereof. (Id.) The 
dairy equipment was of no value to Hrs. Romrell without the 
real estate, since it was an integral part of the total operation. 
(R. 319; 323). 
Having made her decision to attempt either to purchase the 
?roperty or bring the loan current, Respondent first contacted 
Mr. Noall Bennett at Zions Bank in Salt Lake City on April 10, 
1975. (R. 239-41). Mr. Bennett gave Plaintiff a copy of the 
bank's appraisal of the property, explained the procedures 
1nvolved in a foreclosure sale, and told her that it was too 
late to cure the default. (R. 243; 316-17). Plaintiff was 
~ncouraged to become involved as a potential buyer at the 
:or"closure sale. (R. 243-44; 249). At the conclusion of 
-3-
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the meeting, Mr. Bennett made an appointment for Mrs, Romrell 
to meet the next day with Angus Belliston who was responsible 
tor the foreclosure proceedings. (R. 249). 
Mrs. Romrell returned to Zions Bank in Salt Lake City the 
next day and was introduced to Angus Belliston. (R. 250). She 
expressed her interest in acquiring the old family homestead 
and was told that the bank would be pleased if she would enter 
the picture. (R. 252, 332). Mr. Belliston informed her that 
the bank had a prior agreement with Mr. Floyd Brown of Dairy 
Capital Corporation to allow the latter to purchase the property. 
(R. 250-51; 332). Dairy Capital Corporation had entered into 
an agreement with Zions on March 19, 1975, to lease and operate 
the dairy if Zions took peaceful possession of same. (Plf's. 
Ex. 2 at para. ll. The March 19th agreement also contained 
the terms of purchase of the real and personal property. (Plf's. 
Ex. 2 at para. 5, 8, 9). Mr. Belliston explained the details 
of the Brown purchase agreement and gave Respondent a copj 
thereof. (R. 252-53; 332). He further stated that he would 
contact Floyd Brown to determine whether he would be willing 
to allow Mrs. Romrell to purchase the property and in turn 
lease the dairy from her. (R. 252-53). 
Mrs. Romrell again met with Angus Belliston at Zions Bank 
in Salt Lake City on May 2, 1975. (R. 253). At this meeting !>II· 
Belliston informeu Respondent that he had talked to Floyd Bro~n 
who had agreed to the change and that Zions was wllling to sel. 
the dairy farm and equipment to Respondent for 5190,000.00, 1f 
she would agree to lease t:1e dalr:; ;:o ~\r. Brm'n. (F. 255, 33° 
-4-
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Plaintiff agreed to this arrangement, since if she acquired 
the property she would need someone to operate the dairy. (~) 
The parties also discussed how Respondent proposed to 
finance the purchase. (R. 255). Mr. Belliston informed her 
that Zions would be willing to finance the purchase if she 
would put up certain real property in Utah County as security. 
(R. 255-56). Mrs. Romrell accepted this as a commitment to 
sell her the property on the same terms offered to Floyd Brown 
and decided to discuss financing with her banker, Orville 
Gunther, at the Bank of American Fork. (R. 253, 255-56). 
During the month of June, 1975, Mrs. Romrell devoted her 
efforts to arranging financing for her intended purchase. 
(R. 256-59). She discussed the matter with Angus Belliston 
on several occasions. (R. 260; 262). She also discussed 
financing with Orville Gunther, President of the Bank of 
American Fork. (R. 258). Although at this time Respondent 
was also interested in acquiring the entire farm, which con-
sisted of approximately 450 acres, and sought to determine the 
total bank debt on the property, Zions was never able to 
furnish this information to her. (R. 259-61). 
On July 14, B75, Mrs. Romrell met with Angus Belliston, 
Lawrence Muirbrook, Robert Muirbrook, and Floyd Brown in Mr. 
Belliston's office in Salt Lake City. (R. 264-65). Since 
cions Bank of Ogden had granted the original loan to Muirbrook 
Far~s and was successor trustee under the Trust Deed securing 
oam~, Mr. carl Reed from that bank was also present. (R. 265; 
-l Clll- g "7) • 
-5-
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During this meeting, Angus Belliston informed Mrs. Romrell 
that due to legal technicalities, the real property would have 
to be sold separately from the personal property. (R. 265). 
Respondent expressed alarm at this information, since the dairy 
could not be operated without both real and personal property 
as a unit. (R, 265-66). Mr. Belliston also reported that the 
bank was going to bid $15,000.00 on the personalty, but since 
Mrs. Romrell might have to bid against outside third parties 
the bank would consider allowing a credit against the total 
purchase price of $190,000.00, (for the equipment and real 
property) if Mrs. Romrell had to bid more than $15,000.00 for 
the equipment at the sale. (Id.) On July 22, 1975, the bank 
agreed to allow a credit of up to $65,000.00 on a bid for the 
personalty. (R. 405-06; 547-48). 
on July 23, 1975, the parties met again at Zions Bank in 
Salt Lake City, to get final instructions concerning the sale 
to take place the next day. Present were Floyd Brown and his 
attorney Lowell Summerhays, Lawrence and carl Muirbrook and 
their attorney Marlin Jensen, Howard Sherwood (plaintiff's 
CPA), Mr. Belliston, Mr. Reed and Mr. John Allen, attorney for 
the bank. (R. 268-70; 430). In response to a direct question 
from the bank's attorney, ~r. Brown announced that he had 
reached agreement with Mrs. Romrell, that she would bid on 
the personalty at the foreclosure sale, and that he was going 
to lease the dairy from her. (R. 269; 353; 377; 432}. The 
representatives of the bank then outl1ned tne 9rocedures to D~ 
followed at the sale. (R. 269; 376-79; 401-)4; Fl6-D8l. 
-6-
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During this meeting the group was again infoxmed that the 
personal property would be sold in a single lot, (R. 269; 403). 
Either Mr. Belliston or the bank's attorney advised the group 
that Zions would open the bidding for the personalty at $15,000.00. 
(R. 269; 271; 378; 431). He further stated that the bank would 
credit up to $65,000.00 on the total purchase price of $190,000.00 
if it were necessary for Mrs. Romrell to bid that much for the 
equipment; but that if she bid more than $65,000.00, she would 
still only receive a maximum credit of $65,000.00 on the total 
purchase price. (R. 269; 378). At the time the meeting con-
cluded, it was fully understood and agreed by everyone that 
Mrs. Romrell was going to bid on the personalty and, if successful 
in buying the personal propertY, the bank would convey her 160 
acres of real property also for a total purchase price of 
$190,000.00 for both personal and real property. (R. 271-72; 
407; 475-76; 547-48; 580; 608). 
on the morning of the sale, July 25, 1975, Mrs. Romrell met 
briefly with Angus Belliston at Zions Bank in Salt Lake City on 
her way to the sale in Ogden. (R. 273-74; 512-13). She then 
met Floyd Brown in Marlin Jensen's office in Ogden to execute 
the lease which Mr. Brown, who was an attorney, had agreed to 
c:;repare. (R. 274-75). Upon reading the proposed lease, however, 
)\rs. Rornrell was shocked to discover that Hr. Brown had inserted 
an optlon to purchase G~e property from her in the future at 
:~~ same price she was planning to pay Zions for it. (!..:!..:._) 
"~s~ondent thereupon refused to sign the lease as prepared with 
'J[Jlon since that had never been discussed previously. (~) 
-7-
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Mrs. Romrell went immediately to the courthouse where the 
sale was to be conducted. (R. 275). She met with Angus Belliston 
approximately 15 minutes before the sale and informed him what 
had happened. (R. 276). She inquired what her position with 
the bank was in view of this turn of events. (R. 362). Accord-
inq to both Mrs. Romrell and her brother, Lawrence, Mr. Bellis ton 
reaffirmed Zions' commitment to her, stating that the bank would 
live up to its agreement to sell the 160 acres to Mrs. Romrell 
if she were the successful bidder on the personal property. 
(R. 276; 361-63; 379-80; 433-34). Mr. Belliston further stated 
that he believed the agreement of the bank to sell to Mr. Brown 
would be void if the bank didn't acquire both the real and persona: 
property at the foreclosure sale, since such ownership of both 
real and personal property was a precondition of sale to Dairy 
capital. ( Id.) (See Plf's. Ex. 2 at para. 5). He suggested 
they discuss this with Mr. John Allen, Zions' legal counse~ who 
was there to conduct the sale. Mr. Allen confirmed Hr. Belliston'' 
statement. ( Id.) In reliance on these assurances, Respondent 
determined to go ahead with her bid on the dairy equipment and 
personalty. ( R. 369) . 
The sale was held as scheduled, beginning at 12:00 noon on 
July 25, 1975. ( R. 275-78) . John Allen conducted the sale on 
behalf of the bank. ( R. 276-77) . Zions began the bidding for 
the personalty at $15,000.00. ( R. 277) . Floyd Bro;m and El•;a 
Romrell then bld J.gainst one another untll Fespondent b1d 
$65,000.00 and, t~ere bel~c no furt~er b1ds, ~as declared 
successful bidder ~or the 8ersonal ~ro~erty. lid.' 
-0-
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--
Following sale of the personalty, the real property vas 
placed for bid. (R. 277-78). The bank was the sole bidder for 
the entire 450 acres, having previously agreed to make a joint 
bid with Bennett Leasing which held an interest therein. (R. 278: 
666-67; 687-89). Zions was then declared the successful bidder 
for the real property. (R. 278). 
Everything went as had been scheduled and agreed to by 
the parties the preceding day, except for the competitive 
bidding by Mr. Brown on the personalty. (R. 278-79). 
Following the sale, Mrs. Romrell approached Angus Belliston 
to inquire how she was to pay for the property (real and personal). 
(R. 279). After a brief discussion, Mr. Belliston suggested 
that she stop by his office on the way home to sign some docu-
ments relating to the matter. (~) 
Mrs. Romrell met with Mr. Belliston at approximately 5:00 
p.m. that afternoon at his office in Salt Lake City. (R. 281). 
~r. Belliston told her how pleased he was at the way the sale 
had gone and that she was "getting that old farm back." (~) 
He further stated that he had discussed financing with Orville 
Gunther and wanted her to sign certain documents before she 
left. ( R. 232) . 
olr. Bellis ton then presented Mrs. Romrell with four trust 
je~ds and two promissory notes which had not been completely 
(R. 282-83; 304). Two trust deeds (original and 
3 :u~;) were to describe the Muirbrook property which she was 
1: iUlrino from the bank and the other two trust deeds (original 
<_; " ='-·[-!') '.-Jere to cover her Utah County land which was also 
-9-
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being pledged as security for the total purchase price of 
$190,000.00 (R. 282-83; 303-04). The two promissory notes 
were apparently intended to cover the realty and personalty 
separately. Respondent also signed a financing statement and 
security agreement during this meeting. (R. 306-08). She had 
already furnished Zions with a preliminary title report on her 
Utah County property, together with a personal financial state-
ment. (R. 253; 257-58). These documents were all retained by 
Angus Belliston. (R. 282-83). 
On July 30, 1975, a loan of $190,000.00 to Respondent was 
formally approved by the Bank of American Fork. (R. 295). Prior 
to this time, Orville Gunther, President of the Bank of American 
Fork, had discussed the matter with Mr. Belliston who had agreed 
that Zions would participate with the Bank of American Fork in 
the loan. (R. 292). Such participation was required since the 
legal loan limit of the Bank of American Fork was insufficient 
to carry the entire indebtedness. ( Id.) When Respondent in-
formed Angus Belliston that her loan had been approved, however, 
Mr. Belliston told her for the first time that Zions had no in-
tention of selling her the farm. (R. 285-86). 
Mrs. Romrell immediately reported this conversation to 
~lr. Gunther at the Bank of American Fork who, earlier that daj', 
had a~scussed the participation by Zions Bank with the Bank of 
American Fork in the total loan of $190,000.00. (R. 286; 292-
95; 629-30). Upon hearing the report of ~!rs. Romrell, i!r. 
Gunther immediatel1· called :·!r. 3elllston at :ions Bank. For 
the first time :-1r. Eelllston tolJ. ~lr. Gunt-her- t:-:a.t =~ens j:..i 
-1')-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
not intend to sell the real property to Mrs. Raarell. Wbereapon 
Mr. Gunther responded that if Zions had not intended to sell 
the real property to Mrs. Romrell along with the personalty 
there would have been no need to discuss and agree on a partici-
pation on the loan between the two banks. (R. 286, 296). (This 
totally unexpected change of mind occurred after a meeting between 
Mr. Belliston, Robert Muirbrook, and Floyd Brown, at which time 
Mr. Belliston told Mr. Brown that the bank would not sell the 
160 acres to him because Zions had an agreement to sell the 
farm to Mrs. Romrell). (R. 411-12). 
On August 1, 1975, Mrs. Romrell went to Zions Bank in Salt 
Lake City and tendered $65,000.00 to Mr. Belliston as her down 
payment on the purchase price of the dairy farm. (R. 310-111 
367). Mr. Bel1iston accepted the $65,000.00 on behalf of the 
bank, and gave Respondent a bill of sale for the personal property 
only. (R. 310-11). At that time Mr. Belliston also gave Respon-
dent a file containing two of the trust deeds and one of the 
promissory notes she had signed. (R. 312). Mr. Belliston 
testified at the trial on cross examination that he did not 
recall checking to see if all of the documents which Mrs. 
Romrell had signed were included in this file. (R. 634.) The 
bank never gave Mrs. Romrell the titles to vehicles and other 
documents relating to the personal property. (R. 313). 
ltrs. Romrell went ahead with a verbal lease of the dairy 
cqu1pment to Mr. Brown and Dairy Capital. (R. 319-20; 354). 
"!r. Br01m acreed to pay Respondent the sum of $1560.00 per 
-_,r.tcl as rent. Ha<.vever, only four monthly i.=Jayments were 
-11-
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actually received. (R. 320-21). After Dairy Capital was de-
clared bankrupt, Respondent took over the operation of the 
dairy by employing her brother, Lawrence, to manage it on her 
behalf. (R. 321-24). 
Following the date of Dairy Capital's petition in bankruptcy, 
Mrs. Romre11, acting by and through her brother and employee, 
Lawrence Muirbrook, (who had always operated the dairy farm), 
continued to operate the farm, raised cattle thereon, harvested 
the crops, used the silage, lived in the farm house, leveled the 
ground, repaired corrals, and otherwise enjoyed the possession 
of the 160 acres of real property, although the bank has re-
fused to convey title to her. (R. 321-24; 367; 445-46). Zions, 
on the other hand, has not been in possession of the dairy equip-
ment since August 1, 197 5, and has not actually been in possessio~. 
of the real estate. (R. 443-45). 
Up to the time this action was filed the bank insisted that 
all it wanted was to be paid for the amount owing by the Muir-
brooks and that the reason it would not convey the 160 acres to 
Mrs. Romrell (which would have discharged its agreement to her) 
was because it was threatened with litigation by Mr. Brown if 
it did so. However, in October, 1975, Mr. Brown, who was then 
leasing the dairy equipment from Mrs. Romrell, told the bank 
he was willing to allow the bank to complete its transaction 
with Mrs. Romrell and that he would not sue either Zions or 
Mrs. Romrell. (R. 412; 603-05; 636-39). In spite of this, 
Zions still refused to deal ~ith Mrs. Romre!l and conve; t~e 
property to her. (R. 598-602). 
-12-
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Instead, the bank subsequently entered into a contract to 
sell the aforesaid real property to Dairy capital Corporation 
on or about June 10, 1976, provided it could avoid selling the 
same to Mrs. Romrell who by then had filed suit to enforce her 
contract. (R. 530; 598-601). The bank even went so far as to 
agree in its contract with Dairy Capital to defend this suit 
to the "court of highest resort". (R. 601). After Dairy 
capital went into bankruptcy, Zions executed still another 
contract to sell the 160 acres to Lester Froerer if its agree-
ment to sell to Mrs. Romrell were declared void. (R. 465-66; 
602) • 
Thus, in spite of Mrs. Romrell's continued willingness 
and ability to perform her part of the agreement, the bank rAS 
consistently refused to honor its contract to sell her the old 
Muirbrook family homestead. 
-13-
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY REFUSED TO GRANT 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT. 
A. Plaintiff Clearly Established the Existence of an 
Enforceable Oral Contract to Convey Real Property. 
As a general rule, the equitable remedy of specific per-
formance requires proof of the existence of a valid contract 
between the parties which is sufficiently definite and certain 
to enable the court to command the defendants' performance. 
81 C.J.S. Specific Performance §6 (1977) and cases cited therein. 
If the contract is oral, its terms must be clear, definite, cer-
tain, mutually understood, and fair. Holmgren Brothers, Inc. v. 
Ballard, 534 P.2d 611 (Utah 1975); In re Roth's Estate, 2 Utah 
2d 40, 269 P.2d 278 (1954). 
At trial, Mrs. Romrell testified that she met with Angus 
Belliston on April 11, 1975, at which time the terms of the 
proposed sale to Brown were discussed in detail. (R. 250; 
252-53; 332). Those terms included the contracting parties, 
the specific subject matter of the contract, i.e., 160 acres 
of real property together with dairy equipment located thereon, 
the sales price of $190,000.00, the time of performance, to-
gether with other terms and conditions of sale. (Id.) These 
terms had been negotiated by the bank and had been incorporated 
in a written lease agreement signed by .:'illgus Belliston. (See 
Agreement of ~la::-c!-1 19, 1975, Plf's. Ex. 2 at Para. S, 8, 9 1 • 
copy thereof was g1ven to ~rs. Romrell. ( p. 3 J 2) . 
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Mrs. Romrell further testified that Anqus &elliston in-
formed her on May 2, 1975, that Floyd Brown had agreed to allow 
Zions to sell the property to her on the same terma incorporated 
in the lease agreement, if Mrs. Romrell would lease the dairy 
back to Dairy Capital. (R. 255). Mrs. Romrell was pleased 
with this proposal. (~) Mr. &elliston then suggested that 
Zions would assist with financing the purchase for her. (Id.) 
From this point on and until the afternoon of July 30, 
1975, the basic terms of the proposed sale never changed. Both 
parties clearly understood who would be buying and selling, what 
was to be sold, what was to be paid, and when the transaction 
was to occur. The thrust of the additional negotiations 
throughout the months of June and July was to work out the 
details of financing the purchase and procedures to be followed 
at the sale. 
At a meeting held at Zions Bank on July 23, 1975, the 
basic terms of sale were again confirmed by the bank, and the 
sales procedures were finalized. (R. 269; 376-79; 401-04; 
406-08). At this time everyone agreed that Mrs. Romrell would 
bid on the personal property the next day and would be credited 
up to $65,000.00 against the sales price of $190,000.00 for 
the realty and personalty as a unit. (R. 269; 378). The bank 
also received this assurance from Floyd Brown. (R. 269; 353; 
3~7; 432). 
On the morning of sale, Elva Romrell informed Angus Belliston 
~f t~e failure to sign the written lease with Floyd Brown be-
:Ju~~ of the insertlon of an option to buy in the lease. ( R. 276). 
-15-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
She specifically asked Belliston what her position with the 
bank vas in light of this development. (R. 362) . According 
to the uncontroverted testimony of Elva Romrell, Lawrence 
Muirbrook, and even Anqus Belliston, Mr. Belliston told Respon-
dent that he believed the bank had no contract with Floyd Brown 
if Zions didn't obtain title to both realty and personalty 
at the sale. (R. 276; 361-63; 379-80; 433-34). But he went 
further in that he suggested and actually obtained a legal 
opinion from John Allen, Zions' counsel, that the bank had no 
obligation to Brown if these two conditions were not met. (~) 
According to both Elva Romrell and Lawrence Muirbrook, r.tr. 
Belliston further told her that if she were the successful bidder 
on the personal property, Zions would sell her the real property 
according to its prior agreement with her. (Id.) 
The bank asserts on appeal that " there is a complete 
lack of evidence in the record which would show that the terms 
of the contract were mutually understood by the parties." 
(Brief of Appellants at 7). On this point, the record speaks 
for itself: 
BY MR. NIELSEN: 
Q. I would like to ask you a few questions this morning, 
Mr. Belliston, starting with the morning of July 25, 1975. 
That was the day on which the sale was to take place here in 
Ogden; was it not? 
A. That's right. 
Q. And if I recall your testimony yesterday, ',vas that 
on that morning, and before you left your office in Salt Lake, 
Mrs. Romrell dropped into your office there in Salt Lake? 
.'\. That's right. 
-16-
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Q. And brought you a financial statement from Mr. 
Sherwood? 
A. I think so. 
Q. And at that time you were aware, or in the conversation 
with her, that she was on her way to Ogden at that time to 
take part in the sale in accordance with your understanding? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And in fact, at that time it was the intent of 
the bank to proceed up in Ogden with the sale to Mrs. Romrell 
of the personalty and the realty in accordance with the agreement 
that had been reached? 
A. That's right. We were under the impression she had 
reached an agreement. 
Q. Well, but you had reached an agreement with her too; 
hadn't you? 
A. We had agreed to sell her the real estate if she 
assumed the position or made arrangements with Mr. Brown. 
Q. But you had--
A. (interposing) That's right. We had made that 
agreement with her. 
Q. Yes. And it was your intention on the morning of 
the 25th to live up to that agreement with her? 
A. Certainly. 
Q. There was nothing indefinite or uncertain about 
that agreement about how much property it covered; was there? 
A. No. 
Q. The 160 acres, the water right, the home that Mr. 
Robert Muirbrook lived in, and the dairy equipment, the 
personal property that was used; and the total price was 
Sl90,000.00? 
A. That's right. 
Q. And that there was an amount that could be bid up 
:~ 565,000.00 on the personal property which would be applied 
}}3lnst the $190,000.00? 
n. That's right. (R. 608-609). 
-17-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Appellants apparently concede that an oral contract be-
tween Mrs. Romrell and Zions Bank was entered into sometime prior 
to July 25, 1975. (R. 179; 181; 187). They argue, however, that 
this contract was subject to a condition precedent (never affinu. 
tively pleaded) , namely a Romrell lease to Dairy Capital, and tha: 
this condition failed on July 25, 1975, the legal effect of whict 
was to "dissolve" the contract between the parties. once the 
Romrell contract was "dissolved" and since a "new" oral contract 
was not negotiated on the spot, the bank was free to deal with 
whomever it pleased. (R. 179-81) (Brief of Appellants at 6-7). 
The evidence, however, shows that the alleged "pre-condition" 
did not fail, but that Mr. Brown attempted to change the lease 
to include an option to purchase which Mrs. Romrell refused to 
sign. The lease was thereafter consummated. 
If "all bets were off" upon the purported failure of the 
so-called condition precedent as defendants claim, why didn't 
Angus Belliston simply say so? Why did he instead tell Mrs. 
Romrell that the Floyd Brown contract was no problem if the ba~ 
failed to obtain the personalty and then proceed to obtain a 
legal opinion from the banks' attorney to confirm this view? 
Why did he tell Mrs. Romrell that Zions would go forward with 
its agreement to sell her the real property if she obtained t~e 
personal property, ~hich condition was: (l) never part of c~.e 
Floyd Brown agreement; and (2) expressly made ~art of t~e E:~ 3 
Romrell agreement on July 23rd? What poss1ble ~eason did ·~ 
~ave unless Zlons 1ntended to ~ono~ 1~s ac~~e~ent ~it 
• 
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Respondent submits that the only reasonable view to be 
taken of the evidence is that up until July 30, 1975, Zions 
fully intended to live up to its previously negotiated agreement 
with Elva Romrell. In so advising her on July 25th, Zions waived 
any "condition precedent" which may have existed. Ahrendt v. 
Bobbitt, 119 Utah 465, 229 P.2d 296 (1951). Furthermore, the 
alleged "condition precedent" claimed by the bank was the lease 
of the dairy equipment to Brown. No time limitation was placed 
on this condition, and it was fulfilled after the sale when 
Mrs. Romrell actually leased the equipment to Brown. 
zions' theory that no enforceable oral contract exists, 
since an entirely new contract was not negotiated in the 5 or 
10 minutes prior to sale, treats those particular events in a 
vacuum. When all of the evidence is viewed in context, it 
clearly appears that Respondent did establish the existence 
and terms of an oral contract sufficient to permit specific 
performance under the law. 
B. Plaintiff Established Sufficient Acts of Part Per-
formance to take the Oral Contract out of the Statute of Frauds. 
In the case of Holmgren Brothers, Inc. v. Ballard, 534 
c.2d 611 (Utah 1975), relied on by appellants, the Utah Supreme 
~'urt clearly stated the flexible approach to be applied in 
··1:uat1no acts of part performance: 
-19-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The doctrine of part performance, in the 
State of Utah, has not been reduced to a formula, 
as it has in some of our sister states. Thus, 
decisions of this court do not stay the hand of 
equity in the equitable situations created by 
oral contracts for the transfer of an interest 
in land, but the statute is preserved and remains 
to serve its purpose - prevention of fraud and 
injustice. 534 P.2d at 613-14. 
The Court then set forth several factors which may be 
considered in determining whether part performance exists. 
534 P.2d at 614. These factors were included in the appellants' 
requested jury instruction on part performance (R. 105) which 
was given verbatim as the trial court's instruction numberS: 
Before an oral contract for the sale of an 
interest of land can be enforced in favor of plaintiff, 
plaintiff must show by clear, unequivocal and definite 
testimony, or other evidence of the same quality, 
that the oral contract and its terms were clear, 
definite and mutually understood. In addition, 
to establishing these elements showing that the 
contract did in fact exist and was understood by both 
parties to the contract, plaintiff must show one 
of the following: (a) that she made improvement[s} 
upon the land which were substantial, valuable or 
beneficial and for which she could not be compensated 
by the payment of money by the seller, (b) that she 
took possession of the land with the consent of the 
seller [and) that such possession was open, actual and 
definite, and exclusive, in that no other persons 
were in possession from the time of making the 
contract to this date, or (c) that she had delivered 
partial or full payment of the purchase price for 
the land to the seller and that the seller had 
accepted such payment. If plaintiff failed to show 
either that the contract was clear, definite and 
mutually understood or that one of the above three 
conditions listed in (a), (b) or (c) existed she 
is not entitled to a conveyance of the land. (R. 125). 
In reviewing the facts in light of the law contained in ~~:s 
instruction, it is apparent that respondent produced substan:la: 
evidence from whic~ the jury could find t~at not only one, b~: 
perhaps all tnree of the above conditions ~ere sat1sf1ed. 
-20-
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is uncontroverted, for example, that Mrs. Romrell expended funds 
to level some ground and repair some corrals that needed work 
after July 25, 1975. (R. 367). Surely these acts constitute 
valuable or beneficial improvements as required by law. She 
also took possession of the dairy equipment and subsequently 
leased it to Dairy Capital which operated the dairy on the land 
by her permission. (R. 319-20: 354). 
Respondent further testified that after January 1, 1977, 
she directly operated the dairy farm by employing Lawrence 
Muirbrook to live and work on the real property, and that she 
raised cattle, harvested crops, used the silage, and otherwise 
enjoyed actual possession of the real property from that date 
until now. (R. 321-24: 445-46). During this time she was 
never given formal notice to vacate by Zions or even informally 
asked to leave. (R. 367). And even though the bank did 
notify Lawrence Muirbrook to vacate the home on or about April 
of 1976, it took no steps to enforce the notice. (R. 442-43). 
During all this period of time Zions has not been in possession 
of the premises (R. 443-45). Thus based on the evidence before 
the court, the jury could find that this condition was satisfied 
as '"ell. 
The third condition set forth in Holmgren and in Appellants' 
rec1ues ted ins true tion is valuable consideration or payment for 
t:H' property. On this point Mrs. Romrell testified that: (1) 
~ould never have purchased the personalty for $65,000.00 
.~_,ss she would thereby also obtain the 160 acres of realty 
:~o; 323); (2) she ·,.;as told that tr.e $65,000.00 would be 
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applied as a credit towards payment of the $190,000.00 purchase 
price for the realty and personalty as a unit (R. 369; 378); 
(3) she relied on these representations in placing her bids 
(R. 369); (4) she successfully bid for the personalty at the 
sale (R. 277); and (5) she tendered payment of the $65,000.00 
to Zions which was accepted by the bank. (R. 310-11; 367). 
Surely a jury could reasonably find that Mrs. Romrell was doing 
what she claimed and understood she was doing, i.e., making the 
down payment on the total package of both realty and personalty. 
Furthermore, Mrs. Romrell remains ready, willing, and able to 
pay the $125,000.00 balance of the purchase price. (R. 300-01). 
Notwithstanding Respondent's testimony, Appellants argue 
that her acts are not exclusively referrable to the contrac~ 
since the bill of sale referred only to personal property. 
HOwever, this requirement is automatically satisfied in cases 
in which the existence of the oral contract is established 
by competent evidence independent of the acts of part 
performance relied upon to take the contract out of the statute 
of frauds. See e.g., In re Roth's Estate, 269 P.2d 278 at 281. 
But even apart from this rule, payment of the $65,000.00 could 
onl¥ be referrable to the contract for the purchase of the 
entire dairy operation, including the realty, since Respondent 
test1fied that she never would ~ave bid for the personalty 
in the absence of Z1ons' acreement to sell her the realty. 
(R. 319; 323). '•ll;at act b,· ~Irs. Romrell cou:d be more ex-
clusiv~l~· re~errabie ~o t~e con~~ac~ t~an t~ls? 
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When the evidence admitted at trial is viewed in its totality 
and in context, it is clear that Respondent satisfied at least 
one of the conditions of part performance as required by Appel-
lants' own instruction; and the jury so found. Respondent's 
evidence of part performance was, therefore, sufficient to defeat 
the statute of frauds defense urged by the bank. 
-23- d 
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POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY INSTRUCTED THE JURY 
REGARDING THE LAW OF ESTOPPEL 
A. The Facts Constituting the Basis of Plaintiff's 
Estoppel Claim were Properly Pleaded. 
Appellants' major contention regarding estoppel is not 
that the court's instructions misstated the law, but rather 
that they should not have been given, because estoppel was not 
raised in the pleadings or the Pre-trial Order. In support of 
this view, Zions relies on McDonald v. Union Pacific R. R. Co., 
109 Utah 493, 167 P.2d 685 (1946). In McDonald, a F.E.L.A. 
personal injury action, the jury returned a verdict of no cause 
of action. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that by rejecting 
certain proffered instructions the court failed to submit 
his theory of the case to the jury. The Utah Supreme Court 
carefully analyzed the pleadings and the instructions actually 
given by the trial court and concluded that the court followed 
"rather closely" the pleadings and the alleged facts. 167 P.2d 
at 687. 
In the instant case, an analysis of the record will 
reveal substantial unchallenged evidence bearing on matters 
of estoppel. As such, the jury could properly base its verdict 
on principles of estoppel. See, ~· General Insurance Co. 
of America v. Carnicero Dynasty Corp., 545 P.2d 502, 505-06 
(Utah 1976); Buehner Block Co. v. Glezos, 6 Utah 2d 226, 
310 P. 2d 517, 519-20 (1957); Utal1 R. ClV. P. 15 (b). 
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Furthermore, the Pre-trial Order lists the factual allega-
tions in dispute which form the basis of Respondent's estoppel 
defense to Zions' assertion of the statute of frauds. For 
example, the Pre-trial Order contains the Plaintiff's allegations 
that: 
c. Defendants represented that •.• in the 
event Zions First National Bank of Ogden acquired title 
and possession of said real estate, that defendants 
would sell it or cause it to be sold to plaintiff 
pursuant to the aforesaid agreement. 
d. Defendants further expressly encouraged 
plaintiff to bid on the aforesaid personal property and 
agreed, in the event she was the successful bidder, to 
credit her with the amount of her bid up to $65,000.00 
against the $190,000.00 purchase price for both the 
real and personal property. 
2. That in reliance upon said agreement and 
representations, plaintiff, in fact, did purchase the 
personal property at the aforesaid sale on July 25, 
1975, for the sum of $65,000.00. 
3. That on or about July 25, 1975, and August 
1, 1975, plaintiff tendered $125,000.00 to defendants 
as the balance of the agreed purchase price, and that 
defendants refused to tender and refused to convey 
title to the real property to her. 
5. That plaintiff has performed all of her ob-
ligations under the contract and has been, and now is, 
ready, willing and able to pay $125,000.00 to defendants. 
6. That plaintiff has been irreparably damaged 
by defendant's refusal to perform under the contract 
and that plaintiff should be granted specific performance 
of the contract. 
7. That the equipment and personal property so 
purchased is of minimal or nominal value without the 
real property sought to be recovered herein. 
[Para. D] l. That defendant, Zions First National 
Bank, ~.A., willfully with intent to deceive and defraud 
-25-
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or recklessly and without regard to the consequences, 
induced plaintiff to purchase the aforesaid personal 
property by representing that defendants would sell the 
aforedescribed real property to plaintiff if she were 
to purchase said personalty, and that such representa-
tions were false, that defendant knew them to be false 
or made them recklessly or without regard to the conse-
quences, that the plaintiff was unaware of their 
falsity and relied thereon to her detriment by pur-
chasing said personal property. (R. 77-78). 
The Pre-trial Order also lists as one of the seven 
issues of law to be determined at trial, in addition to 
those implicit in the issues of fact, the following: 
Is plaintiff entitled to specific performance of an 
oral agreement to sell real estate? (R. 81) . 
The purpose of the rule, adopted by some courts, that 
"[w)here the estoppel is not pleaded, it is inadmissible .. 
is to give the defendant fair notice of the case he is called 
into court to meet." Collett v. Goodrich, 119 Utah 662, 231 
P.2d 730, 733 (1951~ quoting Hemberger v. Alexander, 11 Utah 
363, 40 P. 260, 262 (1895). It is apparent from the above 
excerpts from the Pre-trial order that Appellants were given 
fair notice of the case they were called into court to meet 
and of the factual allegations of estoppel relied upon by 
Respondent. Additional evidence that Appellants were fully 
apprised of the estoppel elements of this case may be found 
by reference to Plaintiff's Memorandum of Authorities in 
Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss filed in 1975 in 
which the doctrine of equitable estoppel was discussed in 
detail. (R. 34-39). 
Respondent recognizes this Court's statement that ''[~]here 
a party seeks to raise an estoppel to a claim set forth in ::~~ 
-26-
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pleadings, facts constituting an estoppel must be pleaded.• 
TracY LOan & Trust Co. v. Openshaw Investment Co., 102 Utah 509, 
132 P.2d 388, 391 (1942) (emphasis added): ~, ~' Barber •· 
Anderson, 73 Utah 357, 274 P. 136, 138 (1929): Bomberger v. 
Alexander, 40 P. at 262. In this case, the factual allegations 
listed above from the Pre-trial Order which form the basis of 
Respondent's estoppel defense fully comply with the pleading 
requirements established by this Court. 
In any event, Rule lS(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
provides that when issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by 
eApress or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated 
in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings. 
Further, Rule 54(c) (1) provides that every judgment "shall grant 
the relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is 
entitled, even if the party has not demanded such relief in his 
pleadings." 
B. Estoppel is a Proper Legal Doctrine Under the Facts 
of this Case. 
Appellants have further objected to the instructions on the 
ground that estoppel is not properly applicable to this case. 
Their theory is that "estoppel may not be used against the 
statute of frauds in such a manner as to frustrate the basic 
policy of the statute." (Brief of Appellants at 10). 
Respondent agrees that estoppel ought not be used in such 
a manner as to frustrate the basic policy of the statute of 
frauds. However, application of this principle is not only 
~roper but necessary in this case to prevent the statute from 
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being used by Zions to perpetrate a fraud. See, McKinnon v. 
Corporation of the President of the Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter-Day Saints, 529 P.2d 434, 437 (Utah 1974); Note, 9 Utah 
L. Rev. 91 (1964). 
The author of the annotation upon which Appellants rely 
recognized the appropriateness of using estoppel as a defense 
to the statute of frauds in a case such as this: 
Basically, the purpose and intent of the statute of 
frauds is, of course, to prevent fraud, and it is only 
consistent with such a viewpoint that the statute 
should not be permitted as a defense where its appli-
cation would have the effect of perpetrating a fraud. 
Thus, courts of equity have often used their powers to 
preclude the assertion of the statute where fraud would 
result. As already pointed out, the doctrine of estop-
pel has been closely allied with basic principles of 
equity, and it has been widely recognized that when the 
factual requirements for application of the doctrine 
are present, equitable estoppel may be invoked to 
preclude a party to a contract from asserting its 
unenforceability by reason that it falls within the 
statute of frauds. 
Annot., Promissory Estoppel as Basis for Avoidance of Statute of 
Frauds, 56 A.L.R. 3d 1037, § 2 (a] at 1042-43 (1974). 
The fact that Utah courts recognize the applicability of 
the doctrine of estoppel in cases such as this is amply demon-
strated by resort to the very opinions relied upon by Appellants. 
In Easton v. Wvcoff, 4 Utah 2d 386, 295 P.2d 332, 335 
(1956), this Court refused to apply the principle of promissory 
estoppel to a damage action .. ,here the damage ·.,as merely 
th~ loss of a aood bargain and no money had been expended in 
rei1anc~ on the re~resentat1ons. T~e Easton court distinguis~ej 
but d1d not cr1tic1z~, Interstate Co. v. 3c:-Slock '!ercanti~e c:::. 
3D F.2d 172 (:oJ.D. renn. 1028). ::::::. ~:-'.3. t C3:3~, -:::-.·= COU!:t dec ~3.r2~ 
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that general principles of estoppel prevented the application 
of Tennessee's statute of frauds to defeat plaintiff's claim 
because "[n]ot only has there been a part-performance • but 
the plaintiff, at the express request of the defendant, and with 
the active assistance of defendant, and on its solemn assurance 
that the contract would be signed as written, except for formal 
changes, has materially changed its position by investing $11,000 
in equipment, $2,000 or $3,000 in cleaning and renovating, and 
$7,000 in conducting the early stages of the business at a 
loss." 30 F.2d at 174-75. The Easton court distinguished 
Bry-Block on the ground that the plaintiff in Bry-Block demon-
strated "an unconscionable injury in that plaintiff spent 
$15,000 on equipment and improvements upon property which 
defendant promised to lease to him," whereas Easton did not 
spend any monies on the leased premises, but was damaged solely 
because of the loss of a good bargain. 295 P.2d at 334-35. 
In the instant case, Zions agreed to sell the dairy farm 
comprised of both real and personal property to Mrs. Romrell 
for $190,000.00. One of the terms of the agreement was that 
Mrs. Romrell could purchase the personal property at the fore-
closure sale and that any amount thus expended up to $65,000.00 
~ould be credited against the total purchase price of $190,000.00. 
ars. Romrell bid $65,000.00 and paid this sum to Zions. Under 
t~ose facts, it is apparent that the bank may not now claim that 
~rs. Romrell did not expend money on the purchase of the dairy 
~arm and was damaged solely by her loss of a good bargain. 
Z1ons also cites Ravarino v. Price, 123 Utah 559, 260 P.2d 
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570 (1953). In that case, the Utah Supreme Court also considered 
Bry-Block and similar cases: 
The binding thread which runs through these cases, 
distinguishing them from the general rule that a mere 
promise as to future conduct will not work an estoppel, 
is the promise desiqnedly made to influence the conduct 
of the promisee, tacitlY encouraging the conduct, and 
although the conduct of the promisee constitutes no 
actual performance of the oral contract itself, it is 
something that "must be done by plaintiff before he 
could begin to perform, as was known to the defendants." 
260 P.2d at 575-576. (Emphasis added.) 
The court distinguished Ravarino from Bry-Block by noting 
that in Ravarino, plaintiff initiated the solicitation to which 
defendants merely acquiesced, and that plaintiff's purchase of 
a second piece of property under the mistaken belief that he 
would also acquire defendant's property was not a step which he 
was reasonably required to take before acquiring title. Id. 
In the instant action, however, the real and personal property 
were operated as an integral unit; and Mrs. Romrell was required 
to purchase the personal property in order to receive a convey-
ance of the dairy farm. Those circumstances clearly bring this 
case within the Bry-Block rationale and are distinguishable from 
the facts in Ravarino. 
The Utah Supreme Court has declared that the usual rules 
of estoppel require "some conduct of the obligee ... which 
reasonably induces the obligor to rely thereon and make 
some substantial change in his position to his detriment." 
Baggs v. Anderson, 528 P.2d 141, 143 (Utah 1974). The same 
court has declared equitable estoppel to be applicable where 
"conduct by one party ... leads another party, in rel1ance 
thereon, to adopt a course of action result1ng in detr1ment or 
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damage if the first party is permitted to repudiate his contract.• 
carnesecca v. carnesecca, 572 P.2d 708, 712 (Utah 1975)7 see 
Koch, Inc. v. J.C. Penney Co., 534 P.2d 903 (Utah 1975). In 
short, estoppel requires conduct by the defendant (such as in-
ducement through a misrepresentation) and an act in reliance on 
the inducement which makes it inequitable for the defendant to 
avoid the contract. Brewood v. Cook, 207 F.2d 439, 442 (D.C. 
Cir. 1953). 
This Court discussed the doctrine of estoppel as it relates 
to land sale transactions in Jacobson v. Cox, 155 Utah 102, 202 P.2d 
714 (1949). There this court approached the issue involving the 
statute of frauds by noting that "the statute should be used for 
the purpose of preventing fraud and not as a shield by which fraud 
can be perpetrated." (202 P.2d, at 720). The court noted therein 
that the plaintiff was familiar with the terms of the distribution 
agreement and knew that the parties were relying on its terms to 
establish their rights and that he was familiar with the use, 
occupancy, and development of the land by defendant's predeces-
sors in interest. The court also held that, due to his knowledge, 
plaintiff could stand in no better position than his mother (from 
whom he obtained title) and that "she would be estopped to claim 
that she could avoid the legal consequences of the contract be-
cause she did not have authority to bind the estate [when she 
signed the distribution agreement]." Id. at 721. Furthermore, 
the court concluded that plaintiff's own conduct estopped him 
from taking advantage of the deficiencies in the contract. "To 
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hold otherwise would permit the statute of frauds to be used by 
him aa a shield to defeat what appears to be a just and equitable 
cause against htm.• Id. at 722. 
Other courts have also applied promissory estoppel under 
circumstances similar to the facts of this case. For example, 
in Brewood v. Cook, supra, pursuant to a written contract appel-
leas purchased eight out of ten lots in a certain parcel from 
appellant with a verbal understanding that, should appellant ever 
decide to sell the remaining two parcels, appellees could purchase 
them according to specified terms. The court declared that the 
appellant could not set up the statute of frauds as a defense to 
enforcement of the verbal contract to convey the remaining two 
lots because: 
With adequate supporting evidence, the [trial] court 
found that appellees would not have executed the writ-
ten contract or accepted conveyance of the eight lots 
and improvements, at a cost to them of $49,500, if it 
had not been for the inducement of the appellant's 
simultaneous agreement to convey subsequently the two 
remaining lots. This factual situation brings the case 
within the rule that one who thus induces another by a 
parol agreement to change his position so materially 
that unless the inducing agreement is enforced a fraud 
results, is estopped to set up the statute of frauds to 
bar such enforcement. 207 F.2d at 441. 
In the instant case, Mrs. Rornrell bid at the foreclosure 
sale and thereafter paid $65,000.00 in reliance upon Zions' assur-
ance that certain real property would be conveyed to her as part 
of a package deal. (R. 269; 271-72; 378). Zions knew that she 
intended to operate a dairy on the property and that acquis1tion 
of both the personal and real property was essent1al to carry 
out that purpose. (R. 265. 66). Appellants were l1en holders 
respect1ng both the real and personal property and t~e S65,00J."' 
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expended by Mrs. Romrell partially satisfied the landowner 
debtor's obligation to the bank. (R. 630-31). Mrs. Romrell 
suffered "an unconscionable injury" in that she expended 
$65,000.00 in acquiring equipment and improvements located 
upon land which Zions promised to sell to her but did not. 
Furthermore, Zions knew that the land in question had sentimental 
value as the homestead upon which Mrs. Romrell and her family 
lived when she was a girl and that Respondent would undoubtedly 
have attempted to make other financial arrangements for the 
acquisition of the property were it not for Zions' assurances and 
?r-omises. (R. 242-53; 316-17). 
As in Jacobson v. Cox, supra, Zions has substantially received 
the benefit from the contract with Elva Romrell by receiving 
S6S,OOO.OO, intended as a partial payment toward the total con-
sideration of $190,000.00, and now improperly attempts to use the 
statute of frauds as a shield to escape fulfilling its obligations 
thereunder. Clearly, it was proper to instruct the jury on the 
law of estoppel. 
-<l-
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POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO INSTRUCT THE 
JURY CONCERNING THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN FORECLOSURE 
OF REAL PROPERTY AND FORECLOSURE OF PERSONAL PROPERTY. 
Without citing any supporting authority, Appellants 
contend that they were entitled to have the jury instructed 
on the difference between foreclosure of a loan secured by 
personalty under the Uniform Commercial Code, and foreclosure 
of a trust deed secured by realty under Utah law governing the 
subject. Their requested instruction merely declares that 
foreclosures on personal property are conducted under the UCC 
and that trust deed foreclosures on real property are controlled 
by procedures prescribed by Utah trust deed foreclosure laws. 
Respondent is at a complete loss to understand how the 
instruction could have assisted the jury, and how failure to 
give the instruction can be deemed to have prejudiced the bank. 
Several of the citations to the record relied upon by the bank 
don't even bear upon the realty-personalty distinction, but deal 
in whole or in part with Mr. Bennett's statement to Mrs. Romrell 
that it was too late to cure the default on the realty secured 
by the trust deed. (See R. 243; 316-17; 371). Furthermore, 
the bank presented evidence to support its position why the 
realty and personalty were offered in bulk at the sale. (R. 
509-lll . Thu~ the evidence from both sides was before the 
Jury, and an instruction on the technical, legal dist1nction 
urged by ~ppellants would not have been ~elpful. 
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POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED 
TO SUBMIT DEFENDANTS' 
BANKRUPTCY INSTRUCTION TO THE JURY. 
Appellants assert that the trial court erred in failing 
to instruct the jury that title to property owned by a bank-
rupt vests in the trustee in bankruptcy and that the property 
is under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bankruptcy Court 
from the moment a Petition in Bankruptcy is filed. (Brief of 
Appellants at 14-15). 
On page 18 of their brief, Appellants state that "the orig-
ina! contract between Defendants and Dairy Capital Corporation 
became invalid when one of its terms failed." That statement 
constitutes an admission that Dairy Capital possessed no 
interest in the subject property under the March 19, 1975 agree-
ment. (Plf's. Ex. 2.) A trustee in bankruptcy "takes the contracts 
of the debtor subject to their terms and conditions." Thompson 
v. Texas Mexican Railway Co., 328 U.S. 134, 141 (1946); see,~· 
Marin v. England, 385 u.s. 99, 101 (1966); Johnson v. Kurn, 95 
F.2d 629, 633 (8th Cir. 1938); In re Penn Central Transportation 
Co., 391 F. Supp. 480 (E.D. Pa. 1975). 
The second contract with Dairy Capital was executed after 
Z1ons agreed to sell the family homestead to Elva Romrell and 
after this action was filed, and was specifically conditioned on 
~1ons' success in this action. (Defs.' Ex. 2 at para. 16). 
\ "trustee takes no title to property which did not belong to 
:1e bankrupt at the time when the bankruptcy petition was filed." 
-'
1 
''2 Jacobv, 138 F.2d 42, 45 (3d Cir. 1943); see, e.g., San Diego 
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Wholesale Credit Men's Ass'n. v. Garner, 325 F.2d 862 (9th Cir. 
1963): In re Dayton Coal & Iron Co., 291 F.390 (E.D. Tenn. 1922). , 
If Respondent succeeds in this action, then she was entitled to 
the possession and ownership of the Muirbrook farm long before 
Zions agreed to sell it to Dairy Capital. When Zions and Dairy 
capital executed their contract, Zions had nothing to convey. 
The above facts are recognized by both the trustee for Dairy 
Capital corporation in the bankruptcy and the Bankruptcy Court, 
and were briefly explained to the trial court out of the presence ' 
of the jury. (See comments of F. Burton Howard, R. 696). The 
action which is the subject of this appeal was automatically 
stayed when the petition in bankruptcy was filed on January 20, 
1977. On March 17, 1978, Mrs. Romrell filed a complaint for 
relief from the stay with the B~nkruptcy Court alleging, in part, 
as follows: 
4. . Plaintiff submits . . that the 
Trustee's interest, if any, is contingent upon 
Zions First National Bank, N.A., or Zions First 
National Bank of Ogden prevailing in the previously 
filed action in Weber County. Plaintiff suggests 
that if she should prevail in such action, neither 
of the Zions Bank corporations nor the Trustee 
would have any interest in the property and that 
the only manner to determine the extent of the 
Trustee's interest is to allow the litigation to 
proceed in Weber County. 
The Trustee's answer to the above referenced complaint, filed 
April 3, 1978, admitted all particulars of the complaint and 
joined in requesting that Mrs. Romrell be allowed to proceed 
with the state court action. The Bankruptcy Court's m1nute 
entry for the hearing on t~e compiainc ~eld ~a· 5, 1973, 
reads as ~allows: 
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Stay order granted for Mr. Howard [plaintiff's 
counsel) to go ahead with Weber County suit. If 
Mrs. Romrell wins, Trustee would have no interest. 
If she loses, Trustee would have some claim. Order 
entered vacating stay. 
The court also properly declined to give the instruction 
because no issues regarding the Dairy Capital bankruptcy pro-
ceedings were before the jury. Defense counsel attempted to 
introduce evidence regarding those proceedings in the trial for 
the first time at the close of Defendants' case when he offered 
Defendants' Exhibits No. 4 and 5, copies of two documents from 
the Dairy Capital bankruptcy case. Plaintiffs' counsel objected 
on grounds of materiality and relevancy. Following argument, 
the court sustained the objection declaring: 
. I'm not going to confuse this action with your 
bankruptcy court. If you have any further questions 
in regard to possession of any of the, why, why go 
ahead and do it through your evidentiary thing. I 
will not admit it. I think it would tend to more 
confuse than anything. I am not going to get that 
complicated. (R.698). 
Defense counsel responded to the opportunity to present additional 
evidence regarding possession by declaring: "Well, we still rest." 
(~) 
Appellants do not now contend that the court erred by re-
fusing the admission of the preferred exhibits, but their sole 
contention is that the court committed reversible error by fail-
1ng to give the requested instruction. Having properly refused 
~o allow the introduction of the above-referenced exhibits and 
d~fense counsel having declined the opportunity to present other 
-··1dence on the subject, the court properly refused the Defen-
iJ~'s' 1equested instruction. The instruction was pure sur-
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plusage with no foundation in properly admitted evidence. It 
would have merely confused the jury. Consequently the trial court 
acted properly in declining to instruct the jury concerning bank-
ruptcy. 
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POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO SUBMIT DEPENDANTS' 
PROPOSED SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES TO THE JURY, SINCE 
THEY WOULD HAVE LIMITED THE JURY'S ABILITY TO CONSIDER 
EVIDENCE FAVORABLE TO THE PLAINTIFF. 
The special interrogatories which Appellants sought to have 
submitted to the jury were entirely self-serving and properly 
refused by the court. The impropriety of the requested interroga-
tories is evident from the wording of the proposed first inter-
rogatory: 
Did defendants, on or about July 25, 1975, enter 
into an oral contract with plaintiff whereby they 
agreed to sell to her the 160 acres of land which 
is the subject of this case? (R. 112). 
Through this interrogatory, Zions attempted to prevent the 
jury from considering the negotiations and transactions in evidence 
which occurred over a period of several months. It also assumes 
that only a "new" agreement made on that day could be enforceable. 
The remaining interrogatories were equally inappropriate because, 
in addition to being self-serving, they were totally dependent 
upon the jury's answer to the first interrogatory. 
The Utah Supreme Court made the following comment in 
Baker v. Cook, 6 Utah 2d 161, 308 P.2d 264, 267 (1957): 
\men a general verdict will best settle the issues, 
it should be used. When specific issues cannot be 
reached by a general verdict, the trial court 
should take advantage of special verdicts or special 
interrogatories. 
The wording of the preceding dictum makes it clear that the 
:~iQl court is to exercise its discretion in determining when a 
>'r.·cral verdict will best settle the issues. That fact is clearly 
~i-nc~d by the court's use of the word "should" rather than "shall" 
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or •must• in describing when a general verdict should be used. 
Furthermore, Rule 49(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
provides that a trial court "may," not "must" or "shall," submit 
written interrogatories to the jury along with appropriate verdict 
forms. 
An annotation in which Baker is cited declares: 
The fundamental principle underlying the 
submission of special interrogatories in connection 
with a general verdict, as provided by Federal Rule 
49(b) and state counterparts, is that such matters 
as whether interrogatories shall be submitted, how 
many there shall be, how shall they be phrased, 
etc., are within the discretion of the trial judge, 
whose rulings in connection therewith will not be 
disturbed in the absence of an abuse of discretion. 
This principle is recognized in most if not all the 
cases discussed herein. 
Annot., Submission of Special Interrogatories in Connection with 
General Verdict under Federal Rule 49(8), and State Counterparts, 
6 A.L.R. 3d 438, §3 at 446-47 (1966). 
The special interrogatories in the instant case were self-
serving and designed to limit the jury's ability to consider 
evidence favorable to the Plaintiff. Consequently, the trial 
court properly exercised its discretion in refusing to submit 
the interrogatories and in concluding that the issues could 
properly be reached by a general verdict. 
-4 'J-
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POINT VI 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT, BECAUSE THERE IS 
BOTH A REASONABLE BASIS IN THE EVIDENCE AND 
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE VERDICT. 
Appellants contend that they are entitled to judgment not-
withstanding the verdict because "the processes of justice have 
been so completely thwarted or distorted • • • that in fairness 
and good conscience the judgment should not stand" and because 
the jury speculated in reaching its verdict. (Brief of Appel-
lants at 17-18). As has been demonstrated in the preceding sec-
tions of this brief, the processes of justice have neither been 
thwnrted nor distorted; and the judgment should be affirmed. 
As the finders of fact in this matter, it was within the 
jury's province to accept Respondent's evidence and to reject 
conflicting evidence presented by Appellants: 
Short of capriciously or arbitrarily rejecting 
credible evidence when there is no sound reason 
for doing so, it is the exclusive province of 
the jury to determine the credibility of witnesses. 
Where there is any reasonable basis for refusing 
to believe a witness they are not necessarily 
obliged to accept his testimony . . . . 
... the granting of a judgment n. o. v. [com-
pletely overrides] the jury and their verdict and 
thus effectively deprives the party of his right 
to a jury trial. Therefore, this can properly be 
done only when under the evidence and the law 
there is no reasonable basis in the evidence, or 
lack of it, to justify the verdict given. 
Holland v. Brown, 15 Utah 2d 422, 394 P.2d 77, 79 (1964) 
(emphasis added). 
In Winters v. W.S. Hatch Co., Inc., 546 P.2d 603, 605 
'~ta~ 1976), the Utah Supreme Court reaffirmed the rule that: 
A motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict 
presents solely a question of law to be determined 
by the court. 
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and that: 
the trial court must view the evidence most 
favorably to the party against whom the motion is 
made. 
If, after having made that review, the trial court concludes 
that there was substantial evidence upon which the jury could 
base its verdict, the jury verdict must be allowed to stand. Id. 
The Koer case cited by Appellants for the proposition that 
a jury may not find facts from speculation and conjecture was a 
slip and fall personal injury action, and the decision concerned 
the plaintiff's failure to present any substantial evidence to 
show how the grape on which she slipped and fell came to be 
placed in her path. This decision is clearly distinguishable 
from the instant case, where substantial evidence of the exis-
tence and terms of a contract to sell real property and of 
estoppel and part-performance was presented at trial. See, 
Koer v. Hayfair Markets, 19 Utah 2d 339, 431 P. 2d 566 ( 1967) 
A jury is not absolutely precluded from using inferences 
in arriving at a verdict, but there must be a sound basis in 
the evidence for the inference relied upon by the jury in reach-
ing its verdict. Campbell v. Safeway Stores, Inc. 15 Utah 2d 
113, 388 P.2d 409, 410 (1964). As in the instant case: 
Whenever there is a genuine dispute as to issues 
of fact upon \oJhich the parties' rights depend, 
they are entitled to have them submitted to and 
settled by a JUr~·. \oJhen the ;:>arties have had a 
full and fair opportunity to present their cause, 
and the Jury has rendered its verdict, it should 
not be 1nterfered with unless there appears some 
compellina reason why justice demands that lt be 
done. 388 P.2d at 412. 
~o such compellins ~eason ~x1s~s 1~ ~:~~~ 2ase, =ions' "l·- -__ -
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POINT VII 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL, SINCE THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL 
EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE VERDICT 
In considering the circumstances under which a trial court 
should grant a motion for new trial, the opinions constantly 
use phrases such as "miscarriage of justice," "no rational basis," 
"misconception of proven facts," "misapplication or disregard 
of the law," "passion and prejudice." Hyland v. St. Mark's Hospi-
tal, 19 Utah 2d 134, 427 P.2d 736, 738 (1967); EFCO Distribution, 
Inc. v. Perrin, 17 Utah 2d 375, 412 P.2d 615, 617-18 (1966); 
Holland v. Brown, supra, at 79; Lund v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 
10 Utah 2d 276, 351 P.2d 9521 954 (1960). 
Although a trial court has discretion in considering a 
motion for new trial, the above language makes it clear that 
the standard to be applied is very stringent and "unless some 
such error or impropriety as [stated above) is clearly shown, 
the verdict of the jury should stand." EFCO Distribution, Inc. 
v. Perrin, supra at 617. The Court, in EFCO, further declared 
that: 
when the parties have had the opportunity of pre-
senting the evidence and arguments concerning their 
dispute to the jury, the judgment of the jury should 
be allowed to swing through a wide arc within the 
limits of how reasonable minds might see the situa-
tion; and the court should not upset a verdict merely 
because it may disagree. If it did so, the right of 
trial by jury would be effectively abrogated and the 
trial may as well be to the court in the first place. 
The court itself must find and follow a rational 
policy in the middle ground between permitting a jury 
to be completely arbitrary and unjust where there is 
~o reasonable basis in fact or law for its action on 
the one hand, and on the other, of himself being 
2rb1trary by null1fying the jury's judgment merely be-
~aus,o> it is not l!' accord with his own. 412 P. 2d at 618. 
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For this reason, the Utah Supreme Court has recognized 
that "in doubtful cases the doubts are resolved in favor of 
submitting the case to the jury; and in favor of supporting the 
verdict when rendered." Lund v. Phillips Petroleum co., 351 
P.2d at 956, Similarly, a court should "interfere with the 
verdict only when it is so outside the limits of reason that it 
must be said that there is no substantial evidence to support 
it.• Id. And where the evidence is in conflict, this Court 
presumes that the jury believed the evidence which supports its 
verdict and reviews the record in that light. Lee v. Howes, 
548 P.2d 619, 620 (Utah 1976); Barlow Upholstery & Furniture Co. 
v. Emmel, 533 P.2d 900 (Utah 1975). 
As discussed above, substantial, competent evidence suffi-
cient to uphold the verdict and judgment was submitted at the 
trial of the instant case. Appellants had a full and fair 
opportunity to present their case, and there is no basis for 
granting a new trial. 
CONCLUSIO~ 
Upon consideration of the facts in the light most favorable 
to the JUry verdict as required on appeal, Gilhespie v. DeJong, 
520 P.2d 878 (Utah 1974), it is clear that i-<espondent establisheC: 
the existence and terms of an oral contract to convey real 
property by substantial, competent evidence. Respondent further 
established sufficient facts from ~hich the jury reasonably 
found part-performance of the aareement on her part and,or an 
estoppel to deny the aareernent ~n the banks' part. 
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Although the banks deny any confirmation of the oral 
contract by Angus Belliston at the foreclosure sale on July 
25, 1975, it was within the exclusive province of the jury to 
decide whom to believe. This court should not substitute its 
judgment for that of the jury which had the opportunity to 
evaluate the credibility of witnesses during a trial lasting 
four days. Since Appellants have failed to establish any com-
pelling reason for reversal, or new trial, the judgment on the 
verdict should be affirmed. 
DATED this 'lS ,,. day of ~ ~ ~ \\ I 1979. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
NIELSEN, HENRIOD 1 GOTTFREDSON & PECK 
By 
Arthur H. N~elsen 
410 Newhouse Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
BOYDEN, KENNEDY, ROMNEY & OWENS 
By Jet \\~OA~G)Jj_Q 
G. Richard H~ll 
-45-
1000 Kennecott Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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